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ABSTRACT 
This paper is one of several papers in which we develop and 
test models o f  2 candidate elect ions under extremely decentra l ized and 
incomplete informat ion condit ions . We as sume candidates do not know 
voter u t il ity funct ions , and that mos t  voters do not observe the 
pol icy pos it ions adopted by the candidates , We assume that uninformed 
actors (voter s and cand idates al ike) have "belief s "  about parameters 
of which they are uninformed , and that they a ttempt to inform these 
bel ief s on the bas is o f  readily obs ervable variables endogenous to the 
system .  Spec i f ical ly ,  in this paper , we assume that uninformed actors 
inform their belief s ,  and hence condit ion their behavior , on the bas i s  
o f  contemporaneous p o l l  and ( binary) endorsement data . A n  equil ibr ium 
is def ined to be a set of strategies , together with a set of belief s ,  
such that a l l  actors are maximizing expected u t i l ity subj ect to their 
belief s ,  and such that no actor wants to rev i s e  his bel ief s 
condi t ional on the information he does observe. This paper develops 
the above model only for the case of a one d imens ional po l i cy space 
with symmetr ic s ingle peaked preferences, 
When the electorate is modeled as being inf inite , with the 
cumul a t ive density of ideal points for both informed and uninformed 
voters being invert ible , we show that regardless of the number o f  
informed voter s ,  i n  a n  equ il ibrium, the candidates behave exa c t ly a s  
i f  a l l  voters have complete informa t ion . They respond to the 
preferences of the uninformed as wel l  as the informed voter s ,  ending 
up at the median ideal point of the entire electorate, Further , we 
show that regardless o f  candidate behavior , if voters are in 
equi l ibrium, their votes w i l l  extra c t  a l l  available informa t ion,  in 
the sense that a l l  voter s ,  informed and uninformed a l ike , will vote as 
if they had perfect informat ion about candidate pos i t ions , Fina l l y ,  
we give a dynamic for convergence o f  vot ing behavior , which shows that 
the model imp l ies a "bandwagon" e f fect , with the speed of convergence 
depending on the ratio of the dens ity of informed to uninformed voters 
at the true candidate midpoint , 
In addit ion to the theoret ical result s , we run some 
experiments to test the imp l icat ions of the model ,  The experiments 
show a moderate degree of support for the model, 
ELECTIONS WITH LIMITED INFORMATION : 
A FULFILLED EXPECTATIONS MODEL USING CONTEMPORANEOUS POLL 
AND ENDORSEMENT DATA AS INFORMATION SOURCES* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Richard D, McKelvey 
and 
Peter c. Ordeshook
In the l a s t  30 years or so , cons i derable effort has been 
expended at attempting to develop a formal theory of political systems 
and processes based on the economic paradigm of rat ional cho i ce .  
Labeled various ly po s it ive po l i t ical theory, public choice , or social 
choice , this effor t encompa sses a broad area of s tudy , including 
spatial elect ion mode l s , coa l i t ion processes , vot ing rules and agenda 
manipu l a t ion . ( See R iker and Ordeshook [1 972] for a review of the 
early work in this area and Shepsle [ 1 9 7 9], Kramer [ 1 97 7], McKelvey et 
al [ 1 9 7 8] for a sampl ing of the recent d iret ions of this l iterature) , 
Generally , however , the models and theories that form the component 
parts of this effort are subj ect to a common and compelling 
critic ism--they as sume that po l i t ical actors such a s  voter s , 
candidates , legislator s , etc . ,  possess a level of knowledge of other 
voter s '  preference s ,  candidate pos i t ions and the l ike that empirical 
invest iga t ion does not support .  Thus , in these mode l s , it is supposed 
typica l ly that candidates a dopt wel l  def ined po s it ions on a l l  issues 
and that voters know these pos i t ions and the is sues (at leas t  up to 
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some well  def ined probabil ity mea sure ) �de spite the well  documented 
empirical fact that voters oftentime s do not even know the name s of 
the candidate s, much l e ss the policies they e spouse (cf Berel son e t  al 
[1954 ), Almond and Verba [1963 ), Conver se [197 5 ), and for an up to 
date review of thi s l iterature ,  Kinder and Sears [1982 )) , The effort 
of thi s  paper can be thought of a s  an attempt to bring the 
informational a ssumptions of such mode l s  more in l ine with what we 
know empirically, 
Thi s  paper i s  one in a ser i e s  of  paper s  in which we study 
election proce sse s under l imited and de centra l iz ed information 
conditions. ( See al so McKelvey and Orde shook [19 83 a, 1 9 83b , 1983c ] ) ,
Specifical ly,  in this and other papers, we develop ruo del s of pol icy 
formation in two candidate elections where most voter s have l ittle  or 
no information about the pol ic i e s  or platform s adopted by the 
candidate s, and where candida t e s  have l ittle  or no information about 
the voter preference functions. 
The key to under st anding and model ing systems in which 
participant s have l imi ted acce ss to information seems to us to be 
rel ated to the ide a s  that have recently been appl ied succ e ssful ly to 
simil ar situations in e conomics, When voter s do not po sse ss the 
perfect information a ssumed in e arl ier mode l s, and when i t  i s  co stly 
to obtain thi s information relative to the pre sumed e xpe cted benefits, 
we a ssume that vote r s  take cue s from other source s, endogenous in the 
system, that are easily observab l e  and which they bel ieve may convey 
useful information.  Such source s may be other vote r s, inter e st 
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groups, hi storical behavior of the candidates, or pol l  re sul t s, 
Regardl e ss of the source , we a ssume voter s will condition thei r  
choice s o n  such " low cost" data , Candidate s, too, may condition their 
actions on such da ta . Thus, there are variab l e s, endogenous in the 
system, which carry information to the uninformed participant s, When 
actor s condition the i r  behavior on the information f rom the se 
endogenous source s, thi s, in i t se l f  wil l change the observed value s of 
some of the endogenous variabl e s. The system i s  in equil ibrium only 
if all participant s are acting optimal ly given availab l e  information, 
and further if the information generated when participant s act in such 
a fashion doe s not change--i. e .  it i s  stabl e,  and consi stent with thi s 
optimization behav ior of all  participant s, 
Several que st ions of considerabl e theoretical inter e st can be 
addre sse d by mode l s  of thi s  sor t ,  The most important and intere st ing 
of the se que st ions is the extent to which the equil ibria of sy stems 
with l imited information corre spond to the equil ibria of sy stems with 
full information,  That i s, do  the  pol icy outcome s corre spond t o  the 
outcomes that would prevail wer e  all  participant s to have ful l 
information? As we show, in thi s and other pape r s, such a 
correspondence can frequently be e stabl i shed, 
The model devel oped in this paper a ssume s the information 
source f or uninformed voter s i s  pol l  data and interest group 
endorsement s, Our mode l i s  a model of a single e l ection, so no 
historical  information is avail ab l e ,  There are two cl a sse s of 
participant s: vote r s  and candida te s, However, the voter s are further 
partitioned into informed and uninformed vote r s, All vote r s  have 
single peaked preference s over a one dimensional i ssue space , X. 
Strategies  avai l ab l e  to candidate s are to adopt po sitions in the 
pol icy space ,  and strateg i e s  avail able  to voter s are to vote for one 
candidate or the other,  The candida tes do not know voter uti l ity 
functions, and the uninformed voter s do not know the candidate 
po si tions, The only source of information for the uninformed agent s 
i s  " intere st group endo r sement" information and the r e sul t s  of a 
"Gal lup pol l "  of all  voter s. In addi tion,  uninformed vote r s  know 
where their  ideal  point i s  in the di stribut ion of total ide al po int s­
- i .  e ,  they know how l iberal or conservative they are with respect t o  
the remaining population,  
In  this model one might  e xpect that the infor med voters, by 
virtue of their  be tter information, would have a di sproportionate 
impact on the f inal outcome,  On the contrary, the informed vot e r s  by 
acting on their  superior information, end up reveal ing i t ,  {through 
the pol l  and endorsement data ) to others, so that in equil ibrium, we 
obtain the re sul t de scribed above : The equil ibrium extrac t s  a l l  
choice relevant information so that all  voter s vote a s  if  they had 
ful l  information,  The pol icie s adopted by the candida te in 
equil ibrium reflect the preference s of the uninformed as well  a s  the 
informed voters. 
Our approach in this and companion pape r s  para l le l s  the 
devel opment of rational expectations mode l s  in e conomics, {cf ,  Muth 
(1961 ], Luca s  (1972 ], Radner (1972 ,  197 9 ]  and Gro ssman (1978 ,  1 9 82 ]  
4 
5 
for development and reference s to some of thi s extensive l i terature ) ,  
In that l i teratur e ,  the actor s are buyers and sel l er s, and the 
information that i s  of concern i s  the future state  of the world�a 
state that effect s the future marke t value of the commodity being 
traded ,  The que st ion addre ssed by the rational e xpe ctations 
l i terature i s  what will  happen to the marke t pri ce of a commodity when 
only a f ew special ized participant s, cal l ed insiders, have information 
regarding the future sta te of the world.  In those mode l s, agent s are 
abl e to condition their choice s, and derive information from 
endogenous variabl e s  such as the price or historical marke t data . The 
principal re sul t to emerge i s  called the efficient marke t s  hypothe si s, 
which a sser t s  that the market will  behave a s  if everyone had 
informat ion, since the rel evant information about the sta te of the 
world is i t se l f  conveyed to the other participant s through the pr ice ,  
Thi s  paper shows how the rational expe ctations v iew can be 
appl ied to mode l s  of  pol itical proce sse s. The corre spondence be tween 
the mode l s  we develop and the rational expe ctations mode l s  in 
e conomics is that in our mode l s  interest groups or informed voter s 
perform the same funct ion a s  the insider s  in the rational expe ctation 
marke t model s: their choice s provide signal s  to the other 
participant s ( vote r s  and candida te s a l ike ) that convey information 
about the relevant prop erties  of the election system, Namely, they 
convey some sketchy, but useful information about the relative 
po sitions of  the candida te s, Further, an e l ection or poll  outcome 
serve s  the same role  as the price in the marke t mode l s. Just as the 
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price el ici t s  demand information in marke t mode l s, so the election 
outcome conveys information to the candida tes  about the preference s of  
the voter s, In the model developed here, the true di stribut ion of  
voter prefer ence s i s, to the candidate s, the unknown sta t e  of the 
world,  so the price conveys information about the true sta te of the 
world,  Only when no participant want s to change his  behavior given 
the information that is be ing revealed by the behavior of the intere st 
group s  and the outcome of the e l ection can the system be in 
equil ibrium. Thi s i s  the type of equil ibrium we se arch f or in the se 
mode l s, 
The organiz ation of the paper i s  a s  follows: Section 2 
develops the basic  mode l and def ine s the equil ibrium not i on used here , 
Section 3 pre sent s the main resul t s, which prove exi stence of and
derive  properties  of equil ibria to our model ,  Section 4 spe cifies  a
dynamic "tatonnement" proce ss, corresponding to a ser i e s  of succe ssive 
pol l s, which converge s to a voter equil ibrium for any fixed candidate 
po sitions, Fina l ly ,  in addition to the theoretical work, we de sign 
and run some experiment s intended to te st certain impl ica t i ons of the 
mode l .  Section 5 reports on the se experimental re sul ts, 
2 ,  The Formal Development 
We are given a mea sure space fi = (O,E,µ) of voters, a se t
K = (1,2) of candidate s, and a c l o sed convex se t X � 1R of
alternative s. Voter s in n are partitioned into two cl a sse s, I and U, 
which are referred to as informed and uninformed vote r s, r e spectively , 
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• 
There is a function y : fl � :m. which assigns to each voter, a, a 
• 
characteristic, y (a), referred to as voter a's ideal point, We write 
• • 
ya = y (a), All voters then have utility functions ua: X � :m. which
are assumed to be of the form 
• 
Ix - y Ia (2.1) 
for all x e X.
We now define a game, with players consisting of the voters 
and candidates. The strategy sets are 
Voter a: 
Candidate k: 
Ba = Ko = Ku {O}
sk = x. 
We let !! denote the set of measurable functions from fl into K0 ,
Elements of !! are denoted b, with ba = b(a) e Ba representing the
choice of strategy by a e n. Similarly, let � denote the set of 
functions from K to X. Elements of � are denoted s, with 
(2.2) 
sk = s(k) e Sk representing the choice of strategy by candidate k, We
call ba voter a's ballot, with ba = k representing a vote for
candidate k if k e K ,  and an abstention if k = O. We call sk
' candidate k's policy position, For any b e J!, a e fl, and ba e Ba, we
use the notation b/b' to denote the ballot which results when wea 
' replace ba by ba in b, Similarly, for s e li, sk e Sk' the notation
s/s� denotes the strategy pair resulting when we replace sk by sk in
s, 
A choice of strategies (s, b) e li X !! by all players yields a 
vote, in any measurable C -.;;; fl of 
(2.3) 
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for each k e K 0 • Thus for k e K ,  v�(b) represents the vote in C for
candidate k, and for k = 0 ,  it represents the total abstentions in C, 
n We write vk(b) = vk(b) for the total .YQ.1§. for k, and
v�a(b) = v�-{a}(b) for the vote of all voters except a,
The election outcome is then 
k(b) 
if vk(b) > v_(b), and k e Kk 
otherwise (2.4) 
I,e., the candidate with the greatest number of votes wins unless 
there is a tie, If there is a tie--i,e., k(b) = 0 ,  we assume below 
that a coin is flipped), 
We pick s e :m. with o 2. 0 ,  The payoff functions, 
Ma: � X !! � :m. and A'J.: li X !! � :m. , to voters and candidates, are now
defined by: 
Ma(s,b) ua ( sk(b » + !iua(sb ) (2,5) a 
and 
·fr 
if k(b) = k 
Mk(s, b) if k(b) = k 
otherwise 
(2,6) 
for all a e fl, k e K, and (s, b) e li X !!. We use the convention that 
1 1 ua(sO) = 2'1a(s1) + 2'1a(s2). 
So the payoff to the voter consists of the utility he receives 
for the policy position of the winning candidate plus some small 
increment of utility of the candidate he votes for, The candidates 
care only about winning, The reason for the second term in ( 2 , 5 )  is 
to deal with the non atomic case, where µ({a}) = O. In order to 
insure that, in equilibrium, such voters have positive incentives to 
vote for their preferred candidate, the second term must be added, 
For the finite voter case, it is immaterial if we set & = 0 or & > 0,
In addition to the above, rather standard, development, we 
introduce some structure to allow us to model the imperfect 
information, Specifically, each player has beliefs over certain 
parameters of the above model which he does not observe. We define 
I!: IO = {yly: n � JR such that y is E measurable} to be a set of 
possible assignments of ideal points to voters, For any measurable 
set C � n, x E JR and y e I we use the notation 
Fc<xly)
Gc<xly)
Ec<xly)
µ({a E Clya i X})
µ({a e clya 1 x})
µ({a E Cly = x}) 
a 
Thus, Fc<xly) is the cumulative density function of y in C, while
GC(x ly) is the "reverse" cumulative density function. We write
• • 
Fc<xly ) = FC(x), and F0(xly) = F(xly) so F(x) = F0(xly ) is the
• 
( 2 .7 )  
cumulative density function of the true ideal points, Ya• Also, we 
-a write F (x) for Fn-{a}
(x), Similar notation is used for G and E.
We now define the belief spaces for voters and candidates by 
Voter a: Aa = �
Candidate k: rk = I
( 2 . 8 )  
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Here, � denotes the set of probability measures over the Borel sets of 
�. and ! denotes the set of probability measures over some a algebra 
of I· (We assume sets of the form {ye IIFC(xly) L t} and
{ye !IGC(xly) Lt} are I measurable for all x, t e JR, C e [,) Thus,
voters have beliefs about candidate policy positions, while candidates 
have beliefs about voter ideal points, A belief is simply a 
probability measure over the relevant space, 
We let /i be the set of functions from 0 into li1 and [ denote 
the set of functions from K into I· Elements of /i are denoted l, with 
la = l(a) E Aa denoting the belief of a E N .  Elements of  r are
denoted y, with yk = y(k) e rk denoting the belief by k e K ,  We will
routinely use shorthand notation of the form la(sk ( s_) to representk 
la( {s e �lsk ( sk}), yk(F(xly) < t) to represent
rk( {y E IIF<xly) it}), etc.
For any s e �. we define the endorsement 
e(s) = r: if sk ( s_, for k e K k otherwise 
and the anti endorsement: 
if sk ( s_ for k e Kk 
otherwise. 
( 2 , 9 )  
( 2 . 1 0) 
So the endorsed candidate is the candidate whose policy position is to 
the left, while the anti endorsement represents the candidate to the 
right. 1 1 Also, we let q = (2•2), so for any s e li, the candidate
midpoint between s1 and s2 is q's
For any s e li, and y e y, we define the predicted ballot 
A. 
b(s,y) e 1! by 
for k s K
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�."·''-I: otherwise, (2,11) 
With this notation, we can now define the equilibrium 
definitions used here, 
• • Definition 2.1 Let s s li· A voter equilibrium, conditional on s ,
• • 
is a profile (b ,A ) e 1! X b satisfying
• 
(a) Va s n, V b  s J!, ba s arg maxI 
• I 
E • [M ( s , b /b ) ]
A a a 
(b) V a s I ,  
• • 
A ( {s }) 1a 
( c) V a s U, if e s K, then 
(i) 
e 
v-a(b *> > F-a(/)(ii) => e a 
(iii) v:::.a(b *> > G-a( *> Ya => e 
• • 
where e = e(s ), and e = e(s )
• 
b eB a a
Aa(q's >
• 
a 
• 
ya)
• 
Aa(q's < ya)
= 1 
= 1 
Definition 2,2 A full equilibrium is a candidate profile 
• • • • (s ,y ) E li X r, together With a voter profile (b ,y ) 8 J! X b, such
• • • • that (b ,A ) is a voter equilibrium, conditional on s , and (s ,y )
satisfies, V k e K
(b) If e e K ,
•
where v e
• • 
yk(F(q's ly)
• • 
yk(G(q's ly)
. . 
ve(s ), and
• 1 v ) e 1, and
• 1 v_l 1
e 
• • 
v_ v_( s ) • 
e e 
Thus, in full equilibrium, each player chooses a strategy which 
maximizes his payoffs subject to his beliefs (i,e., voters satisfy 
2,l(a), candidates satisfy 2,2(a)). Further, the beliefs of each 
player must be consistent with the data he observes (i,e,, informed 
voters satisfy 2.l(b), uninformed voters satisfy 2,l(c), and 
candidates satisfy 2,2(b)), 
For players to be able to behave according to the above 
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equilibrium definitions, some implicit assumptions are made about what 
contemporaneous information each player observes, and about what each 
player knows about the structure of the model, Before discussing the 
equilibrium conditions, we specify these information assumptions. 
I :  
U: 
K :  
The contemporaneous data each player observes is: 
•
s 
e(s
•
), 
• 
vk(s )
• • 
s ,vk(s )
Thus, informed voters observe the actual candidate positions. The 
uninformed voters, on the other hand, only observe the contemporaneous 
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e ndorsement and vote (or pol l )  total s .  The c a ndida tes observe 
ca ndidate positions a nd co ntemporane ous poll  data . 
Al so, all player s are a ssumed t o  have some knowledge of the 
basic  structure of the model :  Spe cifically,  they know that a l l  voter s  
have util ity func t ions o f  the form ( 2 , 1) ,  al though they do not know 
other voter s '  ideal  poi nt s .  Further, each voter , a ,  is a ssumed t o  
know the rel ative po sition o f  his own ideal poi nt i n  the i s sue space : 
• • 
Thus , voter a knows F ( ya) a nd G ( ya) - the number of voters to h i s  left  
a nd r i ght . Note that we do not require that he know F(x )  or G ( x )  for 
• 
x f Ya · Fi nally ,  when there i s  no reason to conclude otherwise , each
pl ayer assumes  that all  other players are ful ly informed a nd rationa l .  
As w e  will see,  i n  e quil ibrium, this a ssumpt ion i s  j ustif ied, 
We now discuss each of the condi tions i n  the equilibrium 
def ini tions ,  in tur n, 
Voter Strat e gi e s :  Def ini t i on 2 , l ( a )  
This condition require s each voter to pick a strate gy which 
maximize s  his  expected payoff subj ect to his bel iefs--regardle s s  of 
the behavior of other vote r s .  Thus ,  he must pick a domina nt strategy 
to the game whose payoff is E •[M ( s , b ) ] . For tuna te ly, s ince theA. a a 
choice i s  discret e ,  and the payoff Ma( s , b )  is "po sitively respo ns ive , "
a strate gy of cho o s i ng b to maximize E •[u ( s h ) ]  achieve s thi s ,  asa A. a a a 
i s  shown i n  the ne xt section, 
Informed voter beliefs :  De f i nition 2 . l ( b )  
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• 
I nformed voter s each observe the true candidate positions ,  s , 
Their  bel iefs  about the c a ndidate pos i tions must be cons i st e nt with 
thi s i nformation, He nce , their beliefs  must be de ge nerate poi nt 
• 
masse s ce ntered o n  s , 
Uni nformed voter beliefs : Definition 2 . l ( c )  
• 
Uni nformed voter s observe the e ndor seme nt ,  e ( s  ) ,  and the vote 
•
vk (b ) ,  for each k s  K0 • 
Condition ( i) insures  that voter a 's bel ief i s  co ns i st e nt with 
the e ndor sement ,  I . e . , he a s s i gns z ero  probability to si tuations 
where the e ndorsed c a ndidate i s  t o  the right of the other ca ndida t e ,  
Conditions ( ii)  a nd ( ii i) bring the voter 's bel ief s i n  
a greement with the observed vote outcome, Voter a knows that,  
excluding his  own vote ,  all  vot e s  for the e ndorsed candidate must come 
from voter s w ith ideal poi nt s  at or to the left  of the c a ndidate 
• • 
midpoi nt ,  q's
• s l + s2
2 wherever that might b e .  This follows from 
his a ssumption  that all  voters  who are voti ng are i nformed a nd 
rationa l .  He nce condition  ( ii)  r equire s that if he observes the vote 
for the e ndor sed candidate to be greater tha n the number of voters  he 
knows to have ideal poi nt s  a t  or to his left ,  the n  he must i nfer  that 
the candidate midpoi nt is to hi s r i ght,  Similarly, condi tion  ( iii)  
requires that if  more voters  are  voti ng for the une ndorsed c a ndida te 
than voter a knows to be at or to his right, the n he must i nfer  that 
the candidate midpoint i s  to his left ,  
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Co nditions ( ii) a nd ( ii i )  are  the key cond i tions driv i ng the 
re sul ts i n  the subseque nt sections , The se conditions formal ize the 
notion  of how it is possib l e  for uni nformed voter s to gather useful 
information from contempor a ne ous vot i ng data , A very loose idea of 
the type of inference being required of the uninformed voter i n  
co ndi tion ( ii)  c a n  b e  captured i n  the statement "Well  i f  that many 
voters  are vot i ng for candidate e, he ca n't be too l iberal . "  
Figure 1 il lustrat e s  the situation for the case whe n n i s
i nf i ni te a nd F i s i nvertib l e .  In  thi s c a s e  w e  have µ({a}) 0 for all  
-aa, so v e = v • e 
-a F = F, etc ,  Al so G ( x )  = µ( OJ - F(x )  for all  x ,  
• -1Her e ,  voters  i n  group A (with ya < F ( ve ) )  must i nfer that the 
ca ndidate midpoint is to the right of their  ideal  poi nt .  Voters  i n  
• -1 • -1group B ( with ya > G ( v_) , or ya ) F ( ve + v0 JJ must i nfer that the e 
candidate midpoint i s  to the l e f t  of their ideal point s ,  The 
rema i ni ng voter s,  those i n  group C, ca n make no i nference , 
Candidate Strate gi e s :  Def i ni tion  2 .2 ( a ) , 
Thi s  condition require s that each ca ndidate choose s a policy 
pos ition to maximize  his e xpected payoff ,  based o n  his bel ief of the 
voter ide al poi nt s ,  Note that each candidate knows the po s i tion of 
• 
the other candidate , but doe s  not know the true voter ideal  poi nts  ya ;
• 
he nce hi s bel ief yk over X. Further,  each ca ndida te ,  in choos i ng his  
optimal strategy,  a ssumes that all  voters  are  i nformed a nd rational , 
I . e . , give n  ideal  points  y e  X for each voter,  and c a ndidate po sitions 
I\ 
s E �. the c a ndidate assume s  that voters vote accordi ng to b ( s , y) , 
v 
e 
A 
believe *
q.s >Ya 
)E--;;-;Jr------B----
--� 
C believe * 
q•s < Ya 
Figure 1 
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The re sul ts i n  section 3 show that if the vote r s  are in equil ibrium, 
the n  they sati sfy this condi tion, 
Candidate be liefs : Def ini tion 2 .2 ( b )  
The se conditions require that candidate beliefs  about voter 
characteristics be consistent with the obs erved vote , The c a ndidates  
• • 
observe s a s  well as vk ( s  ) .  He nce they know the candidate midpoi nt 
• • q s 
vot i ng 
ideal  
• 
e ( s  ) 
• • 
sl + s2
2 Since all voters who are voting are assumed to be 
• 
r a tionally, it  must be that all voter s  voti ng for e ( s ) have 
poi nt s  at  or to the left  of q 's 
• 
, whil e  all  those voti ng for 
must have ideal  poi nt s  a t  o r  to the r i ght of q 's 
• 
He nce for 
• • • • any y e ! in the support set of yk , it must b e  that F ( q  s ly) L ve a nd
G ( q'/ ly )  iv:.
e 
I n  conclud i ng this section, we relate our equil ibrium 
def i nition  to other type s of equilibria for game s  with i ncomplete 
information. Our equil ibrium i s  similar to Har s a ny i '  s B ayesian  
equi l ibrium ( see Har s a nyi [ 1968] )  in  that e a qh pl ayer has b e l iefs  
about the  unknown characteristics  of other pl ayer s .  However, we 
differ s i gnif icant ly from the Bayesian equil ibrium framework in that 
we allow for revision of bel ie f s  based on  observed strate gy choice s of 
other p l ayer s .  The beliefs  are part of the equil ibrium in our setup , 
unlike i n  Baye sian  equil ibria,  where they are datum, In thi s respe ct 
our equil ibrium re sembles  more closely the " r ational expectations "  or 
"ful filled  expectations" equil ibria .  Like these equil ibria ( see  e g. ,  
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Krepps [ 1977] or Grossman [ 1981] ) ,  Our players optimize subj ect to 
beliefs ,  and then beliefs ca nnot be countermanded by obs erved data , 
Howe ver our equil ibrium also differs somewhat from the se equil ibria,  
In a ful filled e xpectations equilibrium, for exampl e ,  it i s  a ssumed 
that the function relati ng states  of the world to observed data 
(price s )  is  not known a prior i ,  but i s  determined as part of the 
equil ibrium def i nition. Here,  on the other ha nd, we a ssume the 
corre sponde nce relating states  of the world ( i , e , , candidate positions 
a nd voter ideal  poi nt s )  to observed data ( i . e . , e ndorseme nt a nd vote 
tota l s )  is  known. In the context of vot i ng mode l s ,  we bel ieve thi s  
assumpt ion make s more se nse than the assumption that uni nformed voters  
must learn the vot i ng corresponde nce , 
3 .  Re sults 
Thi s  section states a nd proves some propertie s of  equil ibria 
to the above mode l ,  Lemmas 1 and 2 deal with voter equi l ibria,  while  
Theorems 1 a nd 2 deal with full equil ibr i a .  
Lemma ! Assume O i s  f i ni te ,  with IOI = n, and with µ(C) = lcl for all
• • • • • 
C � 0, Let s e li sati sfy s1 F s2 • The n  if ( b  ,A ) e � X �is a voter
• 
equil ibrium co nditional on s , it must sati sfy 
( a )  For all  a e I ,  
• • • • 
Ya < q's => b a e ( s  ) 
• • • • 
Ya > q's => b = e ( s  ) a 
( b ) 3 xL, xR e X, sati sfying
where 
FI ( xR)
• i FI ( q's } + T - 1 
• 
GI ( xL } i GI ( q 's ) + T - 1
T = max E ( x }, such that for 
xeX 
• 
Ya < 
• 
Ya >
• 
XL => b a 
• 
x => bR a 
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a l l  a s U, 
= e ( s  
• 
} 
= e ( s  
• 
) 
Proof:  From Def ini tion 2 , l ( a }  and ( 2 .5 ) , it fol l ows that,  Va e fl, 
• 
ha e arg max E •[u ( sk (b ) } + &u ( sb }] , b eB A a a a a a a 
But , from the def ini tion of k (b }, it fol l ows that by voting for 
( 3 , 1 )  
candidate k,  voter a c a n  never cause candida te k t o  do worse than h e  
would if a voted for k o r  abstained ,  Further, b y  fini tene ss  of fl ,  for
some b ,  voter a is pivotal ,  Hence , regardl e s s  of whether 
& ) 0 or & = 0 ,  ( 3 ,1 )  can be rewritten a s ,  V a e fl, 
a e I ,  
* 
But Ya
e = e ( s  
• 
• 
b e arg max E •[u ( sb }] a b eB A a a a a a 
• 
For a e I ,  from Def ini tion 2 .l ( b }, A ( {s )) 1 ,  so, for 
q's 
} . 
a 
• • 
b e ar g  max a [ua ( sb ) ] = arg min 
• 
=> 
So 
b eB a a 
• • Is - y Ie a < 
a 
• Is _  -
• 
ya l, e 
• • • • Ya < q s => ba 
keK 
where 
• • 
[I sk - Ya 
I 1 
e = e ( s  
• 
) and 
Simil arly,  
( 3 .2 )  
( 3 , 3 )  
( 3 , 4 )  
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• • • • q s => ha = e ( s  ) , ( 3 , 5 )  
which proves  ( a }, For part (b ) ,  we f irst show, for a l l  a e U ,  that 
• • 
• • • 
F ( ya } i ve =) ha = e ( 3 , 6 )  
• • • 
G( ya } i v_ => ba = e ,e 
• • • • 
where ve = ve (b ) ,  and v _  = v_(b }. To see this ,  suppose F ( ya ) i ve
• 
and b f. e ,a 
e e 
-a • • -a • Then F ( ya } = F ( ya } - 1 ,  and ve ( b  } 
a e U, using ( ii }  of Def ini tion 2 . l ( c ) ,
• 
v • e So for all  
( 3 .7 )  
• • 
But now, for a set of of s of Aa measure 1 ,  we have q 's ) ya and ( from
( i } of Def ini tion 2 . l ( c }}, se ( s _, e 
For such s ,  u ( s  } ) ua( s _) ,  so a e 
{e ) arg max 
b eB a a 
{e ) arg max E • [ua( sb }] b eB A a a a a 
• 
e 
( 3 , 8 )  
So, from ( 3 ,2 ) , it  fol l ows  that ba e, a contradiction. It follows 
• • • 
that F ( ya } i ve => ha = e ,  The second inequal i ty of ( 3 , 6 )  foll ows in
an anal agous fashion, Now, we set 
XL sup {x 
XR inf {x 
then, using (3 , 6 ) ' for all  a e U, 
e XIF ( x }  < v 
•
) - e 
• 
e XIG ( x }  i v _)
e 
( 3 , 9 )  
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* * * 
Ya < xL => F ( ya) i v_ => b = e ( 3 . 10)  a e 
* * * 
Ya > XR => G ( ya) i v _  => b = e a e 
So xL and xR sati sfy the last i nequalities  i n  part (b ) of the l emma .
We must only show the f irst inequal ities  i n  (b ) .  Using ( 3 . 10)  
together with ( a )  of  the Lemma, we get 
( 3  . 11) 
* * 
where v0 v0 (b ) .  (For exampl e ,  the contraposi tive of the second 
equation i n  ( a )  a nd the second e quation i n  ( 3 . 10)  yields the f irst 
equation of ( 3 . 11) ) .  Adding a nd sub tracti ng F 1(xR ) to the first
equation of ( 3 . 11) , us ing F 1(xR) + FU( xR) = F ( xR) ,  and rearra ngi ng, we
ge t 
But , from the def i nition of xR' and s i nce G is a lower semi
co nt i nuous , monotone decreasi ng s tep function, we have G (xR) >
impl ies 
( 3 . 12 )  
* 
v _. So 
e 
( 3 . 14 )  
2 2  
A simil ar argume nt yields 
( 3 . 15 )  
which compl etes  the proof o f  the l emma. 
Q. E.D.  
The above Lemma e stab l i shes  that in  equil ibri um, all  voters 
( i nformed a nd uni nformed voters al ike ) with the exception of a few 
uni nformed voters  with ideal poi nt s  in the ne i ghborhood of the 
c a ndidate midpoi nt vote as if they had correct i nformation about 
candidate positions . I n  the special case whe n T = sup E ( x )  = 1, we 
x&X 
get the equations i n  (b ) of the l emma become : 
( 3 . 16 )  
Figure 2 il lustrate s the i nterpretation o f  this resul t .  
. * Cl early, as the numbe r  of informed voter s around q s be comes 
de nser and de nser,  the uni nformed voter s '  voting w i ll al so become more 
a nd more i nformed. 
It i s  of cons iderabl e i nterest to determine the l imiti ng 
b ehavior of the mode l a s  the number of voters  be comes l ar ge .  To do 
thi s,  we consider the i nf i ni te voter mode l . Here , we can  formal ize 
the above not ion  of the de nse ne ss of the i nformed voter s through the 
i nvertibility of the cumul ative de nsity funct ion of ideal poi nt s .  We 
get the following a nalogue of Lemma 1. 
Ul 
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0 j.J 
0 
�? 
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,...; 
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� 
0 
,...; 
p 0 
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0 0 
p., p., 
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Assume n is infinite, µ(I) > O, F1 and F are invertible and 
• • • • • 
Let s s � satisfy s1 F s2, and let (b ,A ) s � X & be a voter& > o. 
equilibrium conditional on 
• 
ya 
• 
s • Then it must satisfy, for all a s n,
• 
Ya )
q's 
q's 
• 
=> 
• 
=> 
b 
b 
•
a
• 
a 
= e(s
•
)
• 
= e(s ) 
Or, equivalently, for all a s n, all k s K,
• • • u a ( sk) > u a ( sk
) => b a = k
Proof Invertibility of F implies E1(x) 11JCx) = 0 for all x s X,
which further implies that µ((a}) = 0 for all as n. Thus for all 
a s  n, and b� s Ba' we have k(b/b�) = k(b), So, using (2.5), and the
fact & > 0 ,  for all b s �. we have 
arg max
, 
. , 
E •[M (s ,b/b )]
A a a b sB a a a 
arg �ax E
A
•[ua(sk(b)) + f>ua(sb'a
)] 
b sB a a a 
arg max 
, 
b sB a a
E • [ u ( Sb , ) ].A a a a 
Hence, Definition 2,l(a) reads, for all a s n,
• 
ha s arg max E .cu (sh )]b eB A a a a a a 
(3.17) 
(3.18) 
Using the same argument as in Lemma 1, it follows that if a e I, the 
result of Lemma 2 holds. Hence we need only show that it holds for 
a e U ,
25 
Since µ({a}) = 0 for all a s n, we have F-a(x) = F(x) and
-a = vk(b) for all x 8 :m' k s K, b .J!. Hence (ii) and (iii) ofvk (b) 8 
Definition 2.l(c) read, for all a a U,
• • • • 
v > F(ya) => A.a(q's > ya) = 1e 
( 3 .19) 
• • • • • 
v_ > G(ya) => A.a(q s 
< ya) 1e 
• • • • 
where v = ve(s ), and v_ = v_(s ) • But then, together with (i) of e e e 
• • 
Definition 2.l(c), it follows that if v ) F(ya) • there is a set of 
• 
s 6 �. of A. measure 1, for which q's a 
Is 
• 
any such s, it follows that - y I e a 
e 
> 
< 
• 
Ya and for which s 
Is - /I - a e 
e 
=> u (s e)a 
• 
< 
> 
so {e} = arg max ua(sk). It follows from (3,18), that ba e.k&KO 
s-· For 
e 
ua(s_),e 
Using 
• • 
a similar argument when v_ ) G(ya)' we get that equations (3,19)e 
imply, for all a e U, 
(3.20) 
Now, define � -
1 • xR = G (v_), Then� i xR' since 
XL= F-
1cv:) i F-1(µ(0) - v�)
e 
of F and G, 
• • 
Ya 
< xL => F(ya)
• • 
ya > XR => G(ya)
e 
G-1(v�) = xR. And, by monotonicity
e 
• • < F(xL) v => b = ee a 
(3,21) 
• • ( F(xR) = v_ => b = ea e 
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Putting this together with the informed voters (for whom the result of 
the lemma holds), and using the fa9t that for all x e :m, 
EI(x) = Bu(x) = 0, we get
v: L FI(q's*> + FU(xL)
(3.22) 
Adding and subtracting FI(xL) and GI(xR) respectively, to each of
these equations, as in the proof of Lemma 1, we get, in the first 
• 
equation, FI(q's )
And the second yields 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
From the monotonocity and invertibility of FI and GI' it follows that
XR i q's 
• i XL' 
• 
But we have already shown � i xR. So
Together with (3,21), this yields the desired result,. XL = XR = q s . 
Q,E,D. 
Thus, the above lemmata show that equilibrium behavior by all 
voters implies that the aggregate voting behavior of the voters 
extracts all the relevant information about the candidate positions, 
As we see, for any choice of strategies by the candidates, in 
equilibrium, all voters vote ..!!.§. .!! they had perfect information, 
regardless of whether they are informed or uninformed. It should be 
noted that in equilibrium the uninformed voters still do not know, or 
even have any common probability distribution of, the positions of the 
candidates, However they each have enough probabilistic information 
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about the location of the midpoint between s1 and s2 to allow them to 
make correct voting decisions, So the equilibrium extracts correct 
voting decisions without disseminating fully the information on 
candidate positions. 
We next investigate the characteristics of full equilibria to 
the game, Here, for simplicity, we look only at the infinite voter 
case, where F1 and F are invertible, In addition to requiring the 
true c,d,f,'s to be invertible, we also require the c,d,f,'s of the 
candidate beliefs to be invertible. This we do by setting 
• 0 X = X = {ye X IFCxly) is invertible}, Similar theorems can be 
proven for finite n, but they are messier, because of the non 
uniqueness of admissible strategies for uninformed voters with ideal 
points near the candidate midpoint, We do not present results for 
finite voters here, since (via Lemma 1), in the limiting case, as n 
gets large, they become equivalent to the infinite voter results 
presented here. 
Theorem 1 There exists a full equilibrium to the game defined by 
(2.S) - (2,6), Further, if µ(I) ) 0, F1 and F are invertible, X = y
'
• • • • 
and o 0, any equilibrium ((s ,y ), (b ,A )) e li X [ X � X � must 
• • 
satisfy s1 = s2,
• • -1 I Proof To show existence, we set s1 = s2 = F (t) where t = µ(O) 2. 
• • • • 
Let Aa{s } = 1 for all a e n, and yk({y }) = 1 for all k e K ,  It is 
• 
easily verified that this is a full equilibrium for any choice of b , 
• 
(In particular, we could choose ba = 0 for all a),
• 
• • • • 
Now assume ((s ,y ),(b ,A )) is a full equilibrium, and 
• • 
Pick k s K with sk < s_,k 
• 1,e,, e = e(s ) = k, and 
e = e(s ) = k. Then by.Lemma 2, we have 
• • 
Ya < q's
• 
=> b = ka 
• • • • So, since E(x) = 0 for all x, we have v0 = 0, vk = F(q s ), and 
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(3,25) 
• • • v_ = G(q s ), 
• • 
Hence vk + v_ = µ(O), So, writing t = µ(0)/2, either k 
• • 
vk i t or v_ i t,k 
k 
• 
Assume, w.l,o,g,, that vk it.
Now, for arbitrating s s li• y e y, 
A. 
l\_(s,b(s,y)) 
A. A. 
1 if vk(b(s,y)) ) v_(b(s,y))k 
0 otherwise 
A. 
A. 
v_(b(s,y)) 
k 
(3,26) 
But, using the definitions of b and vk' and manipulating the above
expressions, we can rewrite 
-{:'. 
if lsk - m(y) I < Is_ - m(y)Ik 
A. 
lsk - m(y)I Is_ - m(y)Il\_(s,b(s, y)) if > k 
otherwise 
(3,27) 
where m(y) s Ill is chosen to satisfy F(m(y)ly) = t, 1,e,, m(y) is the 
median of the Ya· (Since F(xly) is invertible, it exists and is
unique), It follows that 
( 3  .28) 
• 
- rk<lsk - m(y)I > Is_ - m(y)I)k 
• • 
Now, we define � to be a median of the m(y) 's with respect to rk'
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• • 1 • • 1 • I,e,, rk(m(y) � mk) 2 2 and rk(m(y) > mk) L 2• Then, for sk = �· we
·1 ,.. ·1 
1 1 have E 
*
[Mk(s sk,b(s sk,y))] 2 2- 2 = 0, So it follows fromrk 
Definition 2,2(a) that we must have 
. ,.. . 
E •[Mk(s ,b(s ly))] 2 0 (3.29) rk
But invertibility of F(•ly) implies that E(q's*ly) = O for all y, 
• Using this together with v0 = 0, Definition 2.2(b) becomes
• • • 
rk(F(q's ly) = vk) = 1. 
• 
Since vk � t, and FC'ly) is monotonic for all
• 
y, we must have rk(m(y)
• • • 
L q's ) = 1, Now if rk(m(y) > q's ) > O, we
• • 
have from (3,28), E •[Mk(s ,b(s ,y))] < 0, a contradiction to (3,29),rk 
q·s*) = 1. B th f ' 
• 
ut en, or sk = q s , we have, from
. ,.. . 
(3.28), that E •[M(s /sk,b(s /sk,y))] = 1, whilerk
. ,.. . E •[M(s ,b(s ly))] O. But this is a contradiction to Definition 
rk
2,2(a), Hence, s1 F s2 leads to a contradiction, so we must have
s1 = s2, which proves the theorem.
Q,E,D. 
Unfortunately it happens that the full equilibria of the game 
(2,S)-(2,6) cannot be narrowed down any further than the set of 
candidate strategies defined by Theorem l, In fact, it happens that 
if voters are in equilibrium, then all candidate profiles, (s*,1*) 
• • • • • • 
where s1 = s2 and r1CF(q's ly)=t) = r2CF(q's ly)=t) = 1 yield full
equilibria under the definition we have given, However it seems 
• • • • 
apparent that if s1 = s2 F x , where x is the median of the true
distribution of voter ideal points, then the equilibrium is somewhat 
unstable. Under our definition, this is formally an equilibrium by 
virtue of the fact that both candidates maintain the same incorrect 
beliefs about the median. Since they both agree on their incorrect 
beliefs, they both adopt the same position as their strategy, There 
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is no endorsement, and voters vote randomly between them, yielding an 
outcome which is consistent with the candidates' incorrect beliefs, 
However, this equilibrium is unstable in the sense that if either 
candidate makes a slight error in choice strategy, then the beliefs of 
both candidates will be subjected to reality testing, and will be 
found to be inconsistent with the observed voting behavior, These 
considerations lead us to define a somewhat stronger notion of 
equilibrium. This stronger version requires that beliefs must be 
consistent not only with the information that is generated when 
candidates adopt their equilibrium strategies, but also with the 
information that is generated when they make small errors: 
Definition 3 ,1 
• • • • Let ((s ,y ), (b .� )) e � X [ X n X � be a full 
equilibrium to the game (2,S)-(2,6), Then it is said to be an 
informationally stable equilibrium iff there is a neighborhood N(s
•
)
• I • I r of s , such that whenever s e N(s ), and (b .�) is a voter 
equilibrium conditional on s', then for each k e K ,  if e(s') e K ,
'Y = (F ( q. s , I y) , L v ) 1 ande 
y=(G(q's' ly) , t v_l 1
e 
where e e (s '), e =e(s'), and v ve(s'), v_ v_(s'), e e e 
Theorem � There exists an informationally stable equilibrium to the 
game defined by (2.S)-(2.6), Further, if µ(I) ) 0 ,  FI and F are
, . . 
invertible, X = X , and & ) O, any equilibrium ((s ,y ),
• • • • -1 (b , A  )) B � x r x � x � must satisfy sl = s2 = F (t), where
t = µ(fl)/2. 
Proof: Existence follows from the same example as in Theorem 1. 
Assume the second part of the theorem is false, From Theorem 1, 
• • • • 
< F-1(t)
• 
must have sl = s2 • Assume, w. 1.o.g, that sl = s2 Pick 
• , • , , 
N(s ) as in Definition 3.1, and pick s 8 N(s ) such that sl < s2
we 
and 
such that q's' = q's*. From Lemma 2, it follows that v1 F(q's') = 
F(q's*) 
, 
= G(q's*) < t, v2 = G(q's') 
3.1 the invertibil i ty of F(' ly) and 
• , • 
r1 (F(q' s' ly) = vl) = 1. So r 1 (m(y) 
> t, 
v = 0 
, 
and v0 = o. 
0 ,  it follows 
> q's
•
) 1, where 
From Definition
that 
m(y) is 
defined, as in theorem 1, to be the median of the Ya• But now, by an 
argument similar to that in the previous theorem, This leads to a 
contradiction to (3,29), 
• • -1 Hence, we must have s1 = s2 = F (t),
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Q,E.D, 
In summary, we have shown that the only informationally stable 
equilibria involve both candidates converging to the true median of 
the entire electorate, If the candidates have converged exactly to 
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the equilibrium, then, of course, there is no useful endorsement or 
poll information generated for the voters, They must vote arbitrarily 
and the outcome is also arbitrary, If either of the candidates 
deviates at all from the equilibrium strategy, then the endorsement 
and poll information will be useful, and, in light of Lemma 1, the 
equilibrium behavior of the voters will extract all information. The 
outcome will be the same as the full information outcome, and all 
voters--informed and uninformed�will end up voting correctly, 
4 .  Additional Results: Dynamics, Speed of Convergence, Bandwagons, 
and Manipulability 
The previous section proves the existence of an equilibrium 
which extracts all relevant information. However, there is no 
guarantee that this equilibrium will ever be located. Here we 
concentrate on voter equilibria, when fl is infinite, and we present a 
dynamic process by which such equilibria might be attained, The 
process corresponds to a series of successive polls, Candidate 
positions are fixed, and at each stage, all voters act rationally on 
the basis of information generated by the previous poll, We show that 
regardless of the initial starting behavior of the uninformed voters, 
this process converges to the full information voter equilibrium, The 
convergence properties of this process resemble in some respects a 
"Bandwagon effect," I,e., the vote share for one candidate increases 
monotonically, at the expense of the other candidate, Further, we 
obtain some results bearing on the speed of convergence. While any 
33 
positive density of informed at the candidate midpoint guarantees 
eventual convergence, the speed of this convergence depends on the 
ratio of the density of informed and uninformed voters at that point, 
Finally, although we do not prove this formally, it appears that the 
above process, as well as the equilibrium associated with it is non 
manipulable. I,e,, given our restrictions on preferences, no voter 
can gain by adopting strategies different from those prescribed in the 
above dynamic. Similarly, and more obviously, in equilibrium no one 
can gain by misrepresenting his preferences, 
Definition 4,1 Fix s
• 
e � and (bo,Ao) e H X �. We then define,
inductively on t, a sequence of profiles (bt,At) s H X � satisfying:
(a) \I a s n, 
(b) \I a 
(c) \I a 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
e I, 
e U, 
At(s 
a e 
t-1 
Ve 
t-1 v_ 
e 
bt e arga 
A!({s.})
< s_) = 1 
e 
max 
b sB a 
= 1 
a 
E t-1 [ua(sb )] A a a 
F(y:) => A!(q's > y:) = 1 
> G(y:) => A!(q's < y> = 1
t-1 v_ 
e 
v_(bt-1) • 
e 
Thus, each profile satisfies the conditions required in Definition 2.1 
for a voter equilibrium with respect to the data generated from the 
previous profile. I.e., bt is the best ballot conditional on the
beliefs At-l, and At are beliefs consistent with the data generated by
34 
the ballot bt-l, For the case of 0 infinite, with F invertible, the
conditions in Definition 2,1 become those given above. 
Using an argument similar to that in Lemma 2, it is easily 
shown that if F is invertible, the ballots bt in the above process
satisfy: 
For a s I, 
For a s U, { : 
where 
and, for 0 � t 
• • 
if Ya < x 
• • 
if Ya > x 
1.f 
• t-1
Ya < x 
1.f 
• t-1ya > x 
•
x 
tx 
• • q s 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
It follows that the only voters voting incorrectly for t 2 1 are the 
uninformed voters with ideal points in the interval between xt and x
•
.
I t 
• • • 
The measure of these voters is precisely v - v I, where v = F(q's )e e . e 
= F(x•). We can now prove:
Theorem 1 If {} is infinite, with µ(I) ) 0 ,  with F, FI and FU
invertible, and & > 0, then the process defined by Definition (4,1) 
converges to a voter equilibrium in the sense that vt � v
•
, v� � v� e e e e 
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• 
x • The asympototic speed of convergence of vt to v* ise e 
• • 
fu(x )/f(x ), where fu and f are the p.d.f,'s of FU and F, 
respectively. 
Proof Since F is monotone increasing and invertible, it is 
continuous, so all three convergence results follow if we prove 
t • v e -7 v e' We have from (4.1) and (4.2)
FI(x
*> + FU(x
t-1)
• t-1 t-1 t 1 F1 (x ) - F1 (x ) + F1 (x ) + FU(x 
- )
• t-1 t-1 [F1(x ) - F1(x ) ]  + F(x ) 
But since v!-l = F(xt-1),
(4.5) 
t t-1 • t 1ve - ve F1(x ) - F1(x 
- ) (4,6) 
In a similar fashion, adding and subtracting FU(x*) to eq ti n (4 5 )  ua o • , 
we get 
Adding C4.6) and (4.7), we get the identity 
• t-1 • t-1 v - v = F(x ) - F(x )e e 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
F * t-1 urther, by monotonicity of F, F1, and FU, it follows that (ve - ve )
has the same sign as x* - xt-l, which has the same sign as the right
hand side of equations (4,6)-(4,8) . But then, it follows that we can 
write vt as the followinge 
where 
t
Ve
t-1v e 
• 
v e
convex combination of vt-l and v* 
t-1v e 
e e 
• 
- v e
(4.9) 
(4.10) 
It is easily verified that 1 > ri > 0 for v!-l F v: and r1 + r2
t "' Thus, it follows that the sequence {ve}t=O is either a monotone
• 
increasing or monotone decreasing sequence, converging to v ,e 
To address the speed of convergence, we note that if 
lvt - v*I, then, for large t,e e 
• 
• 
- F (xt-1)Fu<x ) u 
• 
• 
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1, 
- F (xt-1)..!..t... 
Fu<x ) t-1 fu(x ) u x - x (4 .11) 
Pt-1 
• t-1 F(x ) - F(x )
• F{xt-12 F{x 2 -
• t-1x - x 
-
f(x *> 
Q,E . D .  
To illustrate the above dynamic model, we  give an  example. 
Figure 3 portrays the cumulative distribution of ideal points for the 
uninformed, informed, and all voters (denoted FU, F1 and F 
respectively), The corresponding density functions for the 
uninformed, informed, and all voters are illustrated in the lower half 
of the figure and are denoted fu, f1 and f, Now suppose that 
• 
candidates 1 and 2 adopt s 
• • 
Cs1,s2), as shown in Figure 3 .  An 
initial poll of voters might reveal a random response by uninformed 
voters (hence they split 50-50 between candidates 1 and 2) while the 
informed voters vote correctly, and split 3 0-70 ,  an overall straw vote 
of , 40 for candidate 1, , 60 for candidate 2, We have assumed that 
uninformed voters know where they are on the issue relative to the 
entire electorate, and that each uninformed voter assumes he is the 
only uninformed voter, Hence, voters can infer where the midpoint 
between the candidates is and hence how they ought to vote, 
F 
LO 
• 8 
candidate 
1 2 
I .30 .70 
u .so .50
.40 .60 
I 
u 
candidate 
1 2 
.30 070 
• 72 .28 
.51 ,49 
t t t t 0 1 2 * 
x x x x 
candidate 
1 2 
I .30 .70 
u .85 .15 
. 58 .43 
Figure 3 
Example of Successive Polls 
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F u 
1 .0 
.8 
,6 
.4 
.2 
x 
candidate 
1 2 
I .30 .70 
u .94 .06 
.62 .38 
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Specifically, using the poll data toge ther with the endorsement 
information that candida te 1 is to the lef t  of candidate 2 ,  uninformed 
0 -1 0 voters can infer that the candida te midpoint i s  a t  x = F ( v1 ) ,  So 
everyone to the lef t  of the point x0 ought to vote for candidate 1 and
everyone to the right  ought to vote for candidate 2 ,  That i s ,  in 
accordance with ( 4 .2 )  and ( 4 . 4 ) , uninformed voters  who are below the 
40th percentile on the overall distribution vote for candidate 1 ,  the 
remaining vote for candidate 2 .  This produce s  a second poll result of 
5 1% for candidate 1 ,  49% for candidate 2 ,  Repeating thi s  for a third 
poll yields a 5 7 , 5 %  - 42 , 5 %  division, Continuing in this fashion, the 
polls converge to a voter equilibrium,  in which the vote is the 
correct vote of 6 3 %  for candidate 1,  3 7 %  for candida te 2 .  As was 
shown formally in Section 3 ,  in equilibrium, .!!.l! voters vote A§. if
they had perfect informat ion, 
Finally ,  we say a f ew words about manipulability of the above 
dynamic proce s s, Although we do not formally prove i t  here ,  it should 
be evident that given his  state of information at time t, it will 
never be to any voter's advantage to vote differently than i t  i s  
a ssumed h e  vot e s  in the above dynamic proc e s s .  The rea son for this i s  
because o f  the "multiplier effect" which drives  the above proce s s .  
Namely , uninformed voters cue o f f  o f  the total vote ,  and the larger 
the vote for a given candidate ,  the greater i s  the number  of 
uninformed voter s who will infer it is their interest to vote for that 
candidate ( since all uninformed voter s to the lef t of xt- l  = F-1( vt-l)e 
vote for e and those to the right vote for e ) . Thus,  given his state 
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of information at time t,  in order to encourage other voters to vote 
for the candidate he bel ieves he prefers,  a voter should always vote 
his truthful preference s ,  as we a ssume he doe s ,  
2...... Test  of  the Model 
Thi s  sect ion de scribe s two experiments that are de s igned to 
test  the mode l developed above . We wish to test  both the hypothes i s  
that uninformed voter s u s e  poll information t o  inform their vote and 
the hypothe s i s  that candida tes converge to posi tions that refl ect the 
preferenc e s  of the uninformed as well as  of the informed voter s .  
Thus , it  i s  nece s sary t o  de sign an experiment that allows candidates  
to adj ust the i r  pol icy po si tions , but  a t  the same time keeps candidate 
po sitions stationary enough to a l l ow voters to collect useful 
information on candidate positions through the pol l  resul t s .  
The experiment s we conducted e ach had b e tween forty and f if ty 
subj ect s ,  Two of the subj ect s pl ayed the part of candidate s ,  labeled 
candidate A and B for thi s experiment , whil e  the rest of the subj ect s 
were vote r s ,  Each experiment cons ists  of a sequence of periods , or 
elections , ( See Figure 4 for a schematic diagram of the sequence of 
event s , ) In each period, the two candida tes f irst  adopt pol icy 
po sitions in a one dimensional pol icy space , Candidate po si tions are 
f ixed for the duration of the period, after which the candida te s are 
able to adopt new positions , Once the candidate s have sel ected 
positions , a sequence of two poll s  i s  taken, fol lowed by a f inal 
election,  Each poll  is l ike a Gal lup pol l ,  in that voters are a sked 
Period 
1 
Period 
2 
Candidates Adopt Posit ions 
Informed voters informed of  posi tions 
Uninformed voters only told which 
candidate is furthe st left  
Poll 1 
Poll � 
conduc ted 
Re sult announced 
conduc ted 
Re sul t announced 
Final Vote  conduc ted 
to all voters 
to all  voters 
P..esul t announced to all  voters (but uninformed 
voters not told candida te posi tions ) 
Same a s  above 
t 
e t c ,  
Figure 4 
Sequence of Event s for Experiment s 1 and 2 
Note : Al l pol l s  and votes are by secret ballot,  
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how they would vote if the election were held now, There are two 
classe s of voter s :  informed and uninformed, who are selectively 
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provided with information about the candidate po si tions , The informed 
voters  are told the po sitions of both candidates  at the beginning of 
each period, The uninformed voters ,  on the other hand, are never told 
the position of the candidates .  The uninformed voters are only told 
which candidate po s ition is furthest to the l e f t .  Al l voters,  
however,  are  informed of the poll  re sul t s ,  and hence , if  they wish, 
can attempt to infer candidate positions on the b a s i s  of these 
resul t s .  
Voters a r e  paid for their participa tion i n  each period o n  the 
basis  of the pos i t i on of the winning candidate and their individual 
payoff functions . A sampl e payoff funct i on for a typical voter i s  
given in Figure S .  The payoff function de termine s the amount the
voter will  be paid  if  the w inning candidate adopts  a given posi tion, 
For example,  in thi s sampl e,  if the w inning candidate adopted the 
position 70,  the voter would earn $1.28 in that period, All voters 
have single  peaked, symmetric payoff funct ions,  but the l ocation of 
the individual idea l  point s will differ for different voters ,  
Al though voters do  not  know the distribut ion of voter ideal points ,  
they do know where their  own ideal point i s  i n  rel a tion t o  those of 
the re st of the e l e ctorate . As seen in the sampl e of Figure 5 ,  e ach 
voter is informed about how many voters have ideal point s to the l ef t  
and to the right of  hi s ,  
Although the experiment cons ists  of a number o f  periods , voter 
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preference s remain f ixed across periods, as doe s  the partition of 
informed and uninformed voter s .  Voters know only their  own ideal  
point s ,  not  those of any other voters ,  and candidates do  not have any 
information about voter ideal point s ,  Further, the uninformed voters 
never l earn anything about the pol icy pos ition adopted by ei ther 
candidate in a given period until  the terminat ion of the entire 
experiment , Thus,  there is no po s s ibil i ty for uninformed voters to 
make inference s about candidate po sitions from the historical record 
of candidate po s i t i ons in previous periods , as  they could in our 
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previous experiments (McKelvey and Orde shook [1983 a] ) ,  For a compl ete 
l isting of  the instruct ions , see Appendix A. 
The distribution of ideal points of the informed and 
uninformed voters for our two experiment s is given in Fi gure 6 .  
Notice that in e ach experiment there are approximately equal numbers  
of informed and uninformed voter s ,  with the distribut ion of the 
uninformed voters  b e ing stochastica l ly domina ted by that of the 
informed voter s .  The median informed voter i s  a t  7 5 ,  the median 
uninformed voter i s  at 45-4 8 ,  and the overall median i s  at 60 . 
Our model make s predictions about the candidate behavior a s  
w e l l  as  about voter choice , First , with regard to voters,  we would 
expect,  in each period, the pol l  results to converge to the perfect 
information poll  re sul t .  In the f irst pol l ,  the informed voter s 
should vote correctly, with the uninformed be ing indifferent or voting 
arb i trarily, In the second poll and in the f inal vote,  uninformed 
voters should sort themselves into the appropriate cate gory, by us ing 
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(a) 
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF VOTER IDEAL POINTS 
EXPERIMENT 1 
10 20 30 70 80 90 100 
(b ) 
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF VOTER IDEAL POINTS 
EXPERIM ENT 2· 
O LO���I
L0���2L0���30�=-�-4�0:--�-'-�50:--���60::;-���70!:;--���8�0��--;� ��-;;::100 
POLICY POSITION 
Figure 6 
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information available from the previous poll s ,  I f  no voters  err, then 
as proven in the previous section, this proce ss  should converge to the 
situation where uninformed voter s vote as if they had complete 
information, 
Table  1 summari z e s  the re sul ts  of the f inal vote in e ach 
experiment , showing the number of voters  making e rrors .  An "error" is
simply a difference from the behavior the subj ect would e xhibi t  if  he 
had ful l  information. We see that the informed vote r s  virtual ly 
always vote correctly.  In Experiment 1 there i s  only one error in the 
ent ire experiment ( for the final vote s ) , whi l e  for Experiment 2 ,  there 
are 8 error s ,  or an average of one per period, Of all the vot e s  cast
by the informed voters  in the final period, ove r  97 percent are  cast 
correctly.  The error rate for the uninformed voters i s  substant i al ly 
higher than that for the informed voters,  but s t i l l ,  across both 
experiment s ,  approximately 80 percent of the votes cast  by the
uninformed voters are cast correctly, 
It i s  important to note that the above computation of the 
error rate is actually an over e st imate of the individual level 
errors ,  Since uninformed voter s can only make inference s about 
candidate positions on the basis  of poll da ta,  it follows that errors 
made by one voter can affect the de cisions made by other voters ,  
Under the above computation, a voter may be  making a comple tely 
rational vote based on the information he observes,  but if this 
information is i t s e l f  incorrect,  he will not nece ssarily vote as  if he 
had complete information. We wish, therefor e ,  to de termine the 
SUMMARY OF ERRORS IN FINAL VOTE 
(Errors Based on Assumption of Ful l Information ) 
Informed Voters 
Exnt Exnt 2 
Correct Choice 160 ( 99.4)  149  ( 94 . 9 )  
Error ( U , 6 )  8 ( 5 . 1 )  
Total 161 1 57 
Uninformed Voters 
Exnt Exnt 2 
Correct Choice 1 21 ( 7 5 . 2 )  131 ( 83 . 4)  
Error 40 ( 24 . 8) 26 ( 1 6 . 6 )  
Total 161 157 
SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ERRORS 
(Errors Based on Failure of Equation (2 , 111) ) 
Correct Choice 
Abstain 
Errors 
Total 
Correct Choice 
Error 
Total 
88 ( 7 1 . 5 )  
14 ( 1 1 .4) 
21 ( 17 . 1 )  
1 23 
Second Poll 
Exnt 2 
88 (68.8)  
29 ( 22 . 7 )  
11  ( 8 . 6 )  
1 28 
Final Vote 
Exnt l 
119  ( 83 . 2)  
24 ( 1 6 . 8 )  
143 
Exnt 2 
118  ( 86 , 8)  
18  ( 13 . 2)  
136 
All 
309 ( 97 . 2 )  
9 ( 2 . 8 )  
3 1 8  
A l l  
252 ( 7 9 . 2 ) 
66 ( 20 . 8) 
318  
All 
176 ( 7 0 . 1 )  
43 ( 17 . 1 )  
3 2  ( 12 . 8 )  
251 
All 
237 (84.9)  
42  ( 1 5 , 1 )  
27 9 
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4 7  
proportion of voters  who make correct voting decis ions based .Q.l! �
information availab l e  to them, We assume , then, that uninformed 
voters use the dec i s i on rul e  in equation ( 3 , 6 )  modified for a dynamic 
setting�as de scribed in section 4 .  Thus , we a ssume that for 
a e U, t = 2 ,3 . 
( 5 .1 )  
where v� = vk (bt ) is  the vote for candidate k i n  poll t .  W e  l ook only
at those voter s who have a unique choice given the information 
available  to them, Tabl e  2 compile s  thi s data for the second poll  and 
f inal vote in a l l  periods of Experiments 1 and 2 .  We see that the 
error rate for uninformed voter s average s around f ifteen pecent across 
both experiments for both the f inal vote and the se cond pol l ,  
Finally,  a gl ance a t  Figur e s  7 and 8 il lustrates that most o f  the 
error s  which do occur can be attributed to two or three voter s in e a ch 
experiment , 
Our second hypothe sis  concerns candidate behavior . Figure 9 
shows the sequence of candida te positions in e ach experiment . We see 
that in both experiment s ,  the candida tes converge quickly to a point 
be tween 63 and 65 , The point to which they converge l ie s  between the 
median of the informed voters and that of the total electorate , but 
they are closer to the total median. This is consi stent with what we 
should ant i cipa te given the individual voting behavior of the 
uninformed voter s .  The f act that some proportion ( about 1 / 3 )  of the 
I NDIVI DUAL VOTES OF U N I NFORM E D  
VOTERS (final vote ) 
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Key : The vote of each voter is l isted above h is ideal point,  
Circled votes denote errors , X is the true candidate midpoin t ,  
The two vertical lines represent F-1 cv2) and G-l (J:.)
The numbers next to these lines are e e 
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e and VJ : the votes for the left and right candidate in round 2 .
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F igure 8 
uninformed vote r s  are not uti l iz ing the pol l  information caus e s  the 
effective equil ibrium for the candida te s to sl ide up by several voters 
from the total median, 
Overa l l ,  this experiment provide s qua l if ied s upport for model 
II , We do not have full support for either hypothes i s ,  Rather about 
2 / 3  of the uninformed voters appear to end up voting as if they had 
perfect information, and the positions to which the candidates 
converge i s  corre spondingly to a point about 2/3 of the distance from 
the informed median to the total median. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS 
1-ISSUE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS WITH POLLS 
5 2  
This experiment i s  a study of voting in two candida te 
elections , As subj ects in the experiment , you wil l each be paid for 
your participation in the experiment on the basis  o f  the dec i sions you 
make , If you are careful , and make good decisions , you can make a 
sub s t ant i al amount of money, 
In this experiment , there are two candida tes ,  l abe l ed A and B ,  
and the rest  o f  you are voter s .  The purpose o f  thi s exp eriment i s  to 
test certain idea s  about how voters  and candida tes  make decisions in 
e l ect ions and, in particular,  how they make decisions when their 
information is imperfect or incomple t e ,  The experiment will  consi st  
of a numbe r  of  el ections . In e ach election the candida t e s  wil l adopt 
po si tions in a one dimensional pol icy space , Two succ e s s ive pol l s  
will  then b e  taken i n  which voters can indicate which candida te they 
prefer, and the outcome of each pol l will be announced,  After the 
second pol l ,  voters will vote  for the candida te of their  choice,  and 
the outcome of this vote will  de termine the winning candidate for that 
election, Candida tes  will then be permitted to adopt new pos itions, 
and the process  will  repeat i t se l f, Voters are paid for thei r  
participation o n  the basis  of the i r  payoff funct ion--to b e  de scribed 
in more detail  shortly, and candida tes  are paid for thei r  
participa tion o n  the basis  o f  how many elections they win, 
Before de scribing the experiment in de tail,  let  me de scribe 
the pol icy space and the payoff function of the voters ,  
At  the beginning of the  experiment , voters will  be given a 
payoff chart similar to the sample  chart in front of you, This chart 
depic t s  the pol icy space and a sample payoff function for a voter,  
Candidates  will be given a s im ilar chart ,  Howeve r, the candida te chart 
will only contain the pol icy space,  and wil l  not have � voter payoff 
funct ions , The pol icy space is simply the set of all numbers between 
0 and 100 , and i s  represented on the horizontal axis in the diagram,  
During the experiment , in each period, candida te s will select 
positions in the pol icy space ,  At the end of each period,  each voter 
will be paid for his or her participation in that period on the basis  
of hi s payoff function and the pos i tion of the winning candida t e ,  
Thus , with the s ample payoff chart,  if  the winning candidate  were to 
adopt the posi t i on 4 8 ,  then the voter would earn 90 cent s  for that 
period, 
In the a ctual experiment , the payoff charts for each of the 
voters will be different from the sample chart . Further, the payoff 
funct i ons for di fferent voters may also be different . Each voter will 
have a payoff funct ion which has a peak, or ideal point a t  some point 
in the pol icy space, and decrea s e s  symmetrica l ly as we move away in 
e i ther direction, as in the example in the sample chart , However, 
different voters '  ide al points ,  or peaks , may be at different points 
in the space,  and their payoff functions may de crease at  different 
rate s ,  One important rule in the experiment is that the information 
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5 4  
on your payoff chart i s  priyate information. None of the other voters 
or candidates  should know the information on your chart . At no t ime
should you show, talk about , or in any other way reveal any 
information about your payoff chart to the other subj ect s .  Further,  
at no time during the experiment are you t o  have � communications 
w ith any of the other subj ects  except those exp l ic i tly provided for in 
the rule s .  
Are there any que stions about the payoff chart? If not ,  I 
will  proceed to a de scription of the exp e riment itself ,  
The experiment itself  is  divided into a number of periods or  
elections , Each period will  consi s t  of a sequence of two poll s  
fol lowed by a n  e le ction, At the beginning of each period, the two 
candidate s ,  A and B ,  will each adopt pol icy posi tions , These 
posi tions will hold throughout that  period, and the candida tes  will  
not be permitted t o  modify or change the s e  pos i tions unt i l  the next 
period, The pos i tions adopted by the two candida te s JLi.!.! not be made 
pub l i c ,  Rather, you, as  voters w ill  selectively b e  provided w ith 
informat ion about the candidate pos itions,  Before each pol l ,  some of 
the voters will be informed as to the actual posi tions o f  the 
candidates ,  The remaining voters will  only be given l im i ted 
information about the candidate positions .  They will  only be told 
which candidate i s  farthest t o  the left and which is furthest  t o  the 
right,  
After the candida tes have adopted their posi tions, and the 
voters have been given their information, we will then take a pol l of 
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all voters .  You may think of this a s  a Gal lup Pol l .  Voters will  be 
a skeo t o  indicate the candida te they would vote for if the election 
were held now. Al l voters will  fill  in thei r  bal lot cards and hand 
them in, Thi s  will  be done a s  a secret bal lot ,  The vote will  be 
tal l ied and announced. At this point, additional information will  be 
provided, and a second poll will be taken, After two such pol l s ,  the 
final information will  be prov ided, and we w il l  proceed to the f inal 
vot e .  These votes w i l l  al so be cast in secret, and the experimente r  
w i l l  then tally the vote , We will  then announce the winning candida te  
and proceed to the next period, 
In order to s e lectively g ive  information only to some voters,  
the following procedure will  be used,  Before each pol l ,  the 
experimenter will  write,  on the blackboard, coded information about 
the pos ition of each of the candida tes ,  You will  note ,  on the record 
sheet, ( which i s  the second sheet  in the sample  packe t you have been 
given) , that for each period,  and e ach pol l ,  there i s  an entry for a 
code for each candida t e ,  I f  this entry is f il l ed in, you a r e  a n  
informed voter in that period and that pol l .  I f  i t  i s  not, you are 
uninformed, If you are an informed voter, you may obtain the correct 
po sition for the candidate from the coded information on the board. 
To do so,  you j ust  add the code to the coded information on the 
bl ackboard. Thus , in the example ,  if the coded posi tions on the board 
were A= 106 , B= 1 5 7 ,  then the correct position of the candida tes in
the first period are A= 4 8 ,  B= 3 4 ,  Thus, i f  you are an informed
voter, you' l l  be abl e  to obtain the exact posi tions adopted by the
candidate s ,  I f  you are uninformed, the only information you will  be 
given is information on which candida te is furthest to the left ,  Thi s  
will  be posted on the bl ackboard a t  the beginning of each period, 
It should be  emphasized that all voters w i l l  ge t the correct 
information if they are informed at a l l ,  Fur ther, i f  you are 
informed for two succe ssive pol l s  in the same period, then using your 
code , you w il l  ge t the same information in e ach period, So it is 
really only necessary for you t o  compute the candidate pos i tions once , 
It i s  important to emphasize that there i s  no a ttempt in this 
experiment t o  mislead voters as t o  the pos i tion of the candida t e s ,  To 
emphasize this point ,  we invite any interested voter, after the 
experiment , to compare his decoded posi tion w ith the actual position 
of the candidate s . If there i s  any discrepancy, you will  be awarded a
$10 bonus , Note that there are three possib i l ities  in terms of the 
information you m ight rece ive.  You may be an informed voter 
throughout an ent ire election ( i , e , for  both pol l s  and the  f inal 
vote ) ,  you may be uninformed for the enti re election, or you may 
become informed part way through. On the sample  record sheet,  these
possibil ities  are represented in periods 1 ,  2 ,  and 3 respect ively. 
At this point the task o f  the uninformed voters m ight seem an 
impossib l e  one . However, you w i l l  be g iven one additional piece of 
information t o  a s s i st you in your dec i sions , Specifical ly ,  while  
nei ther you nor the candidates w i l l  know the exact  distribution of  
voter ideal  points ,  each of you, a s  indicated on the  samp l e, will  be 
told the total number of the voters  who have ideal  point s  t o  the l eft 
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and to the right of your most preferred position, You can use thi s 
information, in conj unct ion w ith the information you do have, a s  t o  
which candida te i s  t o  the l e f t  and which candidate i s  on t h e  right,  
and the fact that i t  i s  in the interest of the informed voters t o  vote 
sincerely, to formulate your gue ss  about the loca tions of the 
candida tes and hence to de termine your preference for one candida te 
over the other.  
To recapi tul ate,  then, the sequence of events will be as  
fol lows . Candidates  adopt pos i tions , the experimenter will write the 
coded positions on the board for the first poll ,  and the f irst pol l  
will be taken and announced, The experimenter  will write the coded 
for the second pol l ,  and the second poll wil l be taken and announced, 
then the coded for the f inal election will be written, and the f inal 
elect ion will take place,  We then proceed t o  the next period, 
After a prede termined number of periods, the experiment will  
end, At this point , the posi tion of the winning candidate will be 
announced, and voters will be paid the sum of their payof fs for the 
po si tion of the w inning candidate in e ach election, ( Note tha t  in 
e ach election a l l  voters are paid for the posi tion of the w inning 
candidate ,  regardl e s s  of whether or not they voted for tha t  
candida te , )  The candidate payoffs a r e  a s  fol low s :  A candida te w i l l  
receive $2 for each election won and nothing f o r  each el ection lost , 
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